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LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS-IMPLIED LIMITATION ON MANAGEMENT'S RIGHT To SUBCONTRACT-During the existence of
a collective bargaining agreement which included both exclusive recognition and union shop clauses but did not include a management prerogatives
clause, defendant employer, without the consent of the plaintiff union,
contracted out janitorial work which had previously been performed by
three of its employees. Subsequently, these employees were laid off and the
plaintiff's protest, though in compliance with all grievance procedures, was
unsuccessful. Thereupon, the plaintiff sought declaratory judgment relief
under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act,1 alleging that
the defendant had no right to subcontract work customarily performed on
its premises by its employees to individuals who were neither defendant's
employees nor members of the plaintiff union covered by the collective
bargaining agreement. The district court held that the defendant, by its
unilateral action, had breached the agreement. 2 On appeal, held, affirmed, 3

61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
Local 391, UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 193 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
On another issue, the district court was reversed on the question of whether the
defendant had locked out the three employees in violation of the agreement. The
court held that there was no lockout since "there was no coercion or economic
pressure exerted by defendant in this action." Principal case at 198.
1
2
3
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one judge dissenting. The right to subcontract is limited by implication
from the union shop provision, for if the defendant could unilaterally replace its employees with those of an independent contractor the intended
purpose of that provision might be subverted. Local 391, UAW v. Webster
Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
The problem of whether an employer has a unilateral right to contract
out work formerly done by its employees during the life of a collective
bargaining agreement containing union security clauses has previously
arisen in two somewhat different contexts. 4 The first is the courts' consideration of the merits of the question when the agreement does not contain
an arbitration provision, as in the principal case. The second involves the
submission of the dispute to arbitration when there is an arbitration clause. 11
Courts considering the question have been virtually unanimous in concluding that an employer has the right to hire an independent contractor
to do such work in the absence of an express prohibition in the collective
bargaining agreement,6 regardless of whether there is7 or is not8 a management prerogatives clause in the agreement. The apparent rationale of
these cases is that a limitation on management's freedom of operation cannot be implied from the mere fact that the parties have agreed on the terms
and conditions of the particular job in question. If the contract does not
expressly limit the inherent rights of management, of which subcontracting
is one, the employer is free to exercise them in good faith. On the other
hand, the arbitrators have generally reached a different result than the
4 It should be noted that cases involving subcontracting have also arisen before the
NLRB but in a different context than in the principal case. There, the questions that
usually arise are whether subcontracting is a mandatory subject of bargaining within
§ 8(d) or whether the use of subcontracting is a discriminatory practice in violation of
§ 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Here, the question is whether there is a limitation on manage•
ment's right to subcontract, implied from other provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.
5 With respect to the second context, the Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), held the question
to be arbitrable if the contract was silent about subcontracting or even if it stated
that such matters were "strictly a function of management." The Court interpreted
the latter phrase to refer only to areas over which "the contract gives management
complete control and unfettered discretion." It concluded that in this case the parties
did not intend the phrase "to encompass any and all forms of contracting out." Id.
at 584.
6 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Ry. Employees v. Greyhound Corp., 231 F.2d
585 (5th Cir. 1956); Local 386, Dairy Workers v. Grand Rapids Milk Div., 160 F. Supp.
34 (W.D. Mich. 1958); Local 600, UAW v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.
Mich. 1953); United Dairy Workers v. Detroit Creamery Co., 38 L.R.R.M. 2303 (Mich.
Cir. Ct., Wayne County 1956); Standard Refinery Union v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 31
N.J. Super. 548, 107 A.2d 513 (1954). Contra, In re Mandel Laces, 27 Lab. Arb. 440
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
7 Local 600, UAW v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 6.
8 Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Ry. Employees v. Greyhound Corp., 231 F.2d 585 (5th
Cir. 1956).
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courts.9 Their decisions are usually based upon a theory of a limitation
on management's rights being implied from other provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 10 Underlying this approach is the idea that
the recognition of a union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the company's employees extends to all work within the unit. Unless such work is
assigned to employees in that unit the employer could subvert the purpose
of the agreement and effectively defeat recognition of the union. It should
be noted that contrary to the. rigid approach of the courts, the decisions of
the arbitrators appear to be on an ad hoc basis, depending upon an interpretation of the particular collective bargaining agreement and a consideration of certain extrinsic factors,U rather than on any generally controlling
rules and principles.
In this setting, the principal case reaches a result similar to that often
reached by the arbitrators in analogous situations, but the court's basic
approach is unclear from the opinion. In the sense that the conclusion is
based upon a limitation implied from a provision in the agreement, the
approach is not unlike that of the arbitrators. This process of implication
has been used by courts in other settings to expand the terms of an agreement when there are facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant the conclusion that such was the intent of the parties,12 and would appear to be
a justifiable approach in the principal case also, if it had been shown that
the parties in fact intended such a limitation. But the court does not
appear to justify adequately the resting of its conclusion on the basis of
the parties' intent. Its sole reliance on the union shop clause is questionable
in two respects. First, that clause pertains only to the defendant's employees13 and it is clear that the replacements, employees of the independent
9 See generally ELKoURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 341-47 (rev. ed. 1960).
Note, however, that a number of arbitrators have approximated the "reserved rights"
theory stressed by the courts and have held that rights which have not been expressly
delegated are reserved to management. See, e.g., Richmond Baking Co., 30 Lab. Arb.
493 (1957); Waller Bros. Stone Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 704 (1956); Carbide & Carbon Chemicals
Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 74 (1956); A. D. Juilliard & Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 266 (1954).
10 See Electric Auto-Lite Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 449 (1958); Temco Aircraft Corp., 27
Lab. Arb. 233 (1956); General Metals Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. ll8 (1955); Lorraine Mfg. Co.,
22 Lab. Arb. 390 (1954); A. D. Juilliard & Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 713 (1953).
11 Some of the factors are: have bargaining unit employees been laid off; has the
function been contracted out in the past; are the unit employees qualified to do the
work; is the subcontracting done to discriminate against the union; is the employer
losing money on the work? For a tabulation of cases and decisions depending upon the
existence of these and other factors, see Celanese Corp. of America, 33 Lab. Arb. 925,
942-45 (1959). See also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, op. cit. supra note 9.
12 See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), where
the Court implied a no-strike agreement from a clause in the collective bargaining
agreement which expressly imposed upon both parties the duty of submitting the dispute in question to final and binding arbitration.
13 The union shop clause provided: "In order that the Union and its members be
furnished with the most effective means available to demonstrate their responsibility in
discharging their obligations and duties as enumerated herein, the Company agrees to
a Union shop.
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contractor, do not fit into that category. Second, even if the union shop
clause is applicable, the court could have strengthened its position by relying on the aggregate of union security clauses in the agreement including
those relating to seniority rights and exclusive recognition of the union as
the bargaining agent for all employees at the plant. Furthermore, if the
court was really adopting the arbitrators' approach, it is difficult to understand why it did not point out the presence of several factors which have
often influenced arbitrators to imply a restriction. 14 For instance, there
was no past history of subcontracting; the employees were laid off rather
than given other jobs; and no special skills were required for the work
involved. This lack of clarity of approach would seem to raise serious
doubts as to the factors which are necessary prerequisites to a court's willingness to imply limitations on management's rights.
Another significant aspect of the principal case is left unclarified by the
court. Since this is a section 301 action under which it is the duty of the
federal courts to develop a body of substantive law for the enforcement
of collectve bargaining agreements,15 it is important to discern whether the
court was laying down a rule of contract interpretation that must be followed whenever an agreement contains a union shop clause or whether the
decision was based solely on the facts of this case, with the union shop
provision indicating the parties' intent that there should be no subcontracting without the union's consent. Assuming the court intended its conclusion
to state a rule of contract interpretation, there arises the further problem
of whether such a rule would be binding on the arbitrators in cases of this
type. 1 6 This problem might make necessary a reconsideration of the function of arbitration. Is it essentially an area of private settlement or has
it now put on new attire and become primarily a public function subject
to public rules of contract interpretation?
Since this case presents problems which go to the heart of the effect of
language in a collective bargaining agreement and since it creates a split
among the federal courts,17 it appears to be time for the Supreme Court
"All employees (emphasis added) who are members of the Union •.• shall remain
members . . • as a condition of continued employment. Employees (emphasis added)
not members . . . shall be members on and after the thirtieth day thereafter and shall
remain members ... as a condition of continued employment." Brief for Appellee, p. 16.
See note 11 supra.
See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
This consideration would seem to be of considerable significance in view of the
many disputes in this area that are determined by arbitration. See, for example, Arbitrator Dash's compilation in Celanese Corp. of America, 33 Lab. Arb. 925, 942-45 (1959).
Also, even more cases of this type will now be settled by arbitration because of the
Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior 8: Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
11 Compare, for example, the principal case with Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Ry.
Employees v. Greyhound Corp., 231 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1956).
14

15
16
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to settle the question. Arguably, the Court should allow limitations on
management's rights to be implied from other provisions of the agreement,
but should be extremely careful to require that this result be substantiated
by factors which insure that such was the intent of the parties. Hopefully,
the Court will make clear the relevant criteria to be used in future cases
to establish this intent.
A. Paul Victor

